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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
A.M. BELL, 
Plaintiff and Respu.ndent 
vs. 
PARLEY P. JONES, 
Defendant and Appe.llarnt. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
LEON FONNESBECK, 
Attorney for Defendant and Appe:llant. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
A.M. BELL, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
PARLEY P. JONES, 
~, Defendant and Appellant. 
In this case, plaintiff filed a straight suit on a promis-
sory installment note for $850.00, making the usual allega-
tions, and demanded judgment against defendant and ap-
pellant on the installments then due. In his original com-
plaint, the plaintiff did not allege or claim that he was a 
bona fide purchaser for value of the note. But, after de-
fendant filed his answer, alleging that the said :note had 
been ·compromi'Sed and settled by the scaledown agree-
ment (Ex. 10, A b. 12), signed by the payee, Alfred J. Bell, 
the plaintiff filed his "Amended and Supplemental Com-
plainf' alleging that he was a "bona fide holder for value 
of said note without notice of defect of the title thereof." 
The court found plaintiff was :not a bona fide holder for 
value. 
Defendant filed his answer and counter-claim to the 
amended and .supplemental complaint (A b. 3), praying 
judgment on his counter-claim for $277.70, as wrongfully 
collected by plaintiff on said note, due to the fact that the 
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2 
same had been ·comprom1sed and settled by the scaledown 
agreement. Defendant also alleged (A b. 5), that plaintiff 
is estopped, from asserting or claiming that any sum was 
now due from defendant to the payee, Alfred J. Bell, who 
had signed the scaledown agreement. Defendant aLso al-
leged in his Supplemental Answer (A b. 6), that the bal-
ance of the indebtedness from defendant to Alfred J. Bell 
was fully paid by defendant signing notes and mortgage -
totalling _$1100.00, about December 1, 1930, for Alfred J. ,.. 
Bell, which amount was paid by defendant. Appellant, 
also alleged that at the time of the scaledown agreement, 
August, 1934, defendant did not owe and was not indebted 
to Alfred J. Bell in excess of $400.00, which sum was fully 
compromised., scaled-down and settled by the scaledown 
agreement signed by Alfred J. Bell. 
This a:ction was commenced in the City Court of Lo-
gan City, which court held that the note sued on was com-
promised and settled by the iScaledown agreement, and 
dismi·ssed the ·complaint. Plaintiff appealed. The Dist-
rict Court entered its findings of fact and .conclusions of 
law and judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the de-
fendant; frol!l which judgment defendant ha·s appealed to 
this court. The Distri·ct Court held, however, that "plain-
tiff wa:s not a bona fide holder in due course, but merely 
held said note as an assignee from Alfred J. Bell, the 
payee." 
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ARGUMENT. 
1. The Cou..rt e·rred in entering its judgment against de-
fend·ant for the amount of the note $876.89 and $85~.00 at-
torney's fees, and afro. in adjudging that the said l1/m0Unt 
is and represent'S the balanc·e due om the purchas,e price of 
certain land specifically described in the judgment. (As-
signment of Errors, No. 1, 9, and 15.) 
Respondent's counsel argued in the court below that 
~,under the provisions of the N. I. L. (Se·c. 61-1-25, Revised 
Statutes) providing that "every negotiable instrument is 
deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable 
consideration", that a consideration was presumed in 
plaintiff's favor and that the burden of proof rested upon 
the defendant, to prove no consideration, with respect to 
the question of the consideration for the note sued on. 
The Court below accepted that argument and render-
ed judgment accordingly against appellant. It is appel-
lant's contention that the ·consideration presumed, by the 
statute, is merely prima fa_cie; that when that considera-
tion is seriously questiOlned by substantial evidence, then 
that presumption fades away., and the burden of proof 
rests upon the plaintiff to prove consideration by the pre-
ponderance of the evidence, and if he fails to do so he can-
not recover. In other words, the burden of proof in the 
first instance was, and ,continued to be with respondent; 
the ~statutory prima fa·cie presumption, merely relieved 
respondent from going forward with the burden of proof 
in the first instant. Hudson v~s. Moon, 130 P. 774 (Ut.) 
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In ca'Se at bar it is submitted that respondent failed 
~ support the burden of proof which rested on him in this 
case. On the contrary, the preponderance of the evidence 
clearly shows there wa'S no consideration for the note sued 
on. The escrow agreeme,~t, Ex. 6 (Ab. 14), for $3200.00 
dated February 6, 1928, recites that $200.00 was paid as 
a down payment, receipt of which i·s acknowledged by Al-
fred J. Bell in the contract. That escrow agreement also 
recites that the Utah Mortgage Loan Lorporation had a'\ 
$'2500.00 mortgage against said premises, which Alfred J. 
Bell, the seller, agreed to pay and clear up. This escrow 
agreement was assigned and transferred by Alfred J. Bell 
and wife, to the Utah Mortgage Loan Corp_oration, a'S wit-
nessed by assignment attached to the es·crow agreement, 
{Ex. 6), assigning all of their right, title and interest in 
said escrow agreement and all payments to be made there-
under to the Utah Mortgage Loan Corporation. Thus Al-
fred J. Bell assigned and transferred to the Utah Mort-
gage Loan Corporation, his interest in that es·crow con-
tract, and no money was payable to him thereunder. 
It is thus clear that no money whatever was due or 
payable to Alfred J. Bell, on the said escrow agreement. 
There is no evidence that it was ever assigned back to 
Bell. Hence, as the evidence stands, no money whatso-
ever i:s due Bell under that contract. 
Furthermore, from undi'Sputed documentary evidence 
{the paid ·check) , Alfred J. Bell's equity in that escrow 
agreement, could not, after said assignment {covering the 
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5 
$2500.00 mortgage) exceed $400.00 under any circum-
stance, in August, 1934; even assuming that the Utah 
Mortgage Loan Corporation had. assigned or transferred 
that escrow agreement back to Bell, after the $2500.00 
mortgage was paid, of which plaintiff produced no evi-
dence, and which the court has no right to assume. Appel-
lant produced paid checks to Alfred J. Bell totalling 
$580.00 (Ex. 12), paid between the time of the escrow 
' agreement (Ex. 6) and the scaledown agreement (Ex. 10). 
The agreement acknowledges a $200.00 down payment, 
making $780.00, plus the $2500.00 mortgage, makes a total 
of $3280.00 paid by Jones to Bell up to July 1934. At that 
time, Alfred J. Bell ·signed a s·caledown agreement stating 
that the existing indebtedness was $400.00. Considering 
accumulated interest, this would be about corre·ct, assum-
ing that any equity in that escrow had been assigned back 
to Bell, of which there is no evidence. 
Appellant and his witness, Boudrero, both testified 
that he borrowed about $2000.00 from Boudrero to pay on 
that escrow agreement. Alfred J. Bell admitted he knew 
that Jones made a loan from Boudrero to pay Bell on that 
contract (Ab. 25, Tr. 63). That this money was paid on 
the $2500.00 indebtedness which Bell owed the Utah Mort-
gage Loan Corporation, i·s evident from the fa·ct that, at 
the time when Jones made his loan from the Federal Land 
Bank, Boudrero's claim was admitted to be prior in right 
to the claim of Alfred J. Bell. 
The evidence thus shows, considering the payments 
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made, and the assig"~nment of the escrow agreement by Al-
fred J. Bell to the Utah Mortgage Loan Corporation, that 
Alfred J. Bell did not and could not have $850.00 coming 
to him in July, 1934, but that the scale down agreement, 
which recites $400.00 a'S the existing obligation in July, 
1934, was about correct, if the escrow agreement had been 
as:signed back to Bell, which does not appear from the evi-
dence. 
It is therefor submitted that respondent failed to 
'SUstain the burden of proof which rested upon him (~stand­
ing in the shoes of the payee, Alfred J. Bell), relative to 
showing $850.00 then due, as consideration for said note. 
But as stated, the evidence ·shows that not to exceed 
$400.00 ·could then have been due, which amount was settl-
ed by the scaledown agreement. Hence there is no con-
sideration for the .note sued on. 
Furthermore, on the point of no consideration for the 
note ·sued on: The trial court found that the existing obli-
gation of appellant to Alfred J. Bell was $1250.00 We 
have already pointed out that this is in conflict with the 
scaledown agreement signed by Alfred J. Bell, which 
states it was $400.00, and which also recites: "The under-
signed creditor of said applicant hereby agrees that it will 
accept the sum of $150.00 in full satisfaction of the exist-
ing obligation." The Federal Land Bank also, understood 
(as appears from paragraph No. 5 of its closing statement, 
A b. 13) that Alfred J. Bell had agreed "to accpet the sum 
of $150.00 in full satisfaction of his claim." Assuming, 
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7 
but not admitting that the existing obligation was $1250.00, 
it is appellant''S contention and position that an agreement 
to accept, and the acceptance of a lesser amount, from a 
third party as full satisfaction of an existing larger obli-
gation, constitutes a novation, or accord and satisfaction, 
and releases the whole indebtedness. Hence, it follows, 
that in as much as the original obligation (whatever its 
amount) was released and 'Settled by the acceptance of a 
~ lesser sum, that there is no consideration for the promis-
sory note sued on in case at bar; which riote was given to, 
and secretly exacted by Alfred J. Bell, in contravention of 
his scaledown agreement. 
Part payment by third party, received by the creditor 
in full satisfaction of his claim is a good accord and :satis-
faction, as the creditor receives a benefit in securing the 
payment by such third party; otherwise, due to the final 
condition of the debtor, he may not have been able to 
secure payment of any part of the debt. This rule has 
been held to a.pply even though at the time of the payment 
the creditor was 'not aware that the stranger was acting 
for the debtor, 1 Am. Jur. 247. This being so, the court 
in Sigler vs. Sjgler, 98 Kan. 524, 158 P. 864., L.R.A. 1917 A, 
725, did not see how a creditor's righs are affected in the 
slightest by his failure to know and understand that a 
third person is acting as the agent of the debtor in mak-
ing settlement. 
The court further erred in finding and adjudging that 
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the amount found due on the note is the balance due on the 
purchase price of the following described land: 
The North half of Lot 3 and all of Lot 4 of BlO'ck 
3, Plat "D" Logan Farm Survey, containing thirty 
acres, less the land occupied by the O.S.L.R.R. 
·situated in the Northwest Quarter of Section 
twenty-eight, Township Twelve North, Range One 
East of the Salt Lake Meridian. 
Together with any and all water rights and irri-
gation ditches belonging or in anywise appertain- 1 t 
ing thereto, and especially including twenty-one 
shares in the Logan Northwest Field Irrigation 
Company. 
No ,such obligation or claim is made by respondent in 
his pleading. Thus, without any such issue or claim be-
ing made or raised in the pleadings, the court held that 
respondent had a vendor'·s lien on certain described prem-
ises, fo!" the amount and to the extent of the judgment 
rendered. How the· court found out that appellamt owned 
those premises i·s a mystery to us. 
Respondent commenced this action. as a simple suit 
on a promi·ssory note, praying for a personal judgment. 
The court granted him a judgment, secured by a vendor's 
lien, without appellant claiming or asking for it in his 
pleadings. The vendor's lien, by provisions of Sec. 38-0-1, 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, is ,superior to the Home-
stead right. Thus it will be observed that the lower 
·court granted respondent a judgment lien equal in rank 
to a mortgage, for it can be enforced against a homestead 
right of appellant in the premises. Thus, without a.ny 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
amendment, or any pleading to justify it, the court con-
verted a simple action in personam to an action in rem; 
for if this judgment stands, respondent may now proceed 
to enforce his vendor's lien any time against the property 
described in the judgment. 
It is submitted that such a judgment thus departing 
from the issues raised as well as the form theory of the 
action, is reversable error. It is fundamental that the 
trial ·court cannot thus arbitrarily change or depart from 
the theory of the action as fixed by the pleadings, and 
render a different or additional judgment than that pray-
ed for. Plaintiff cannot try his case on one theory or 
pleading and arbitrarily shift to and recover on another. 
1 C. J. 1Q06., 1 C. J. Sec. 1087. 
In the case, Combined Metal'S vs. Bastian, 267 Pac. 
1020, this .court held. 
"The power of the court to permit amendment 
of pleading does not authorize importation, which 
in effect introduces a new or different cause of 
action.'' 
It is submitted that the Judgment as rendered was 
such obvious departure by the Court from the form of 
action, and the i~ssues raised in the pleadings, that no 
further argument is necessary on this point. 
7 Stan. Ency. of Proceedure, 111-138. 
2. The Court erred in failing to find that the note 
sued an repres'ented the existing obligation from appel-
lant to Alfred J. Berzl, the payee in the note,, and in fail-
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ing to find and' hold that p,laintiYf .and/or Alfred J. Bell 
were estopped from· alaim.ing D"r a.sserting that the exist-
ing obligation was any other or- different su.m than 
$400.00, as represented by Alfred J. B'ell in his scal.e:.dJown 
agreement Ex. 10, (Assignment of Errors No. 3, 4, 13). 
Appellant alleged and testified and Alfred J. Bell 
admitted (A b. 25, Tr. 72), that appellant was not indebt-
ed to him for any sum ·except such as was incurred 1} 
through the execution of the es·crow agreement (Ex. 6). 
Respondent produced no evidence to the contrary. 
Alfred J. Bell admitted that he signed and executed 
the scale down agreement (Ex. 10, A b. 12). That agree-
ment reads as follows: 
AGREEMENT. 
"The Federal Land Bank of Berkeley and/or 
the Land Bank Commissioner, having agreed to 
make a loan to Parley P. Jones, on certain condi-
tions, which conditions are made a part of this 
agreement and among which is the condition that 
the applicant's total obligations, both secured and 
unsecured, .shall not exceed the amount of Four 
Thousand Seven Hundred Dollars ($4700.00) when 
said loan i·s completed. 
No'\\r, therefor, the under~signed creditor of said 
applicant hereby agrees that it will accept the sum 
of $150.00 in full satisfaction of the existing oblig-
ation of $400.00 now due it from said appHcant 
and will execute a full and unconditional release of 
said obligation upon the payment of the sum herein 
agreed to be accepted, payment to be made in 
Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation bonds. 
Signed: Alfred J. Bell." 
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Thus, in order to induce the Federal Land Bank to 
make its loan to Jones, Alfred J. Bell specifically repre-
sented that the existing obligation from Parley P. Jones 
to him was $400.00, and agreed that he would accept the 
sum of $150.00 as full~satisfaction of said existing obliga-
tion, whi·ch amount was paid. ·Having made such an 
agreement and representation, and having induced the 
Federal Land Bank thereby to make its loan to appellant, 
and having received his $150.00 from the Federal 
Land Bank pursuant to such representation, it is 
submitted that Bell Is estopped from thereafter 
asserting or claiming anything different. It was 
therefor _error for the court to hold _(Conclusion of Law 
No. 4) that respondent was not e,stopped from asserting 
and claiming that the note sued on was not and did not 
represent the existing obligation between appellant and 
Alfred J. Bell, at the time the scaledown agreement was 
signed. Such finding is in the very teeth of the admitted 
and undisputed evidence, the signed statement of Alfred 
J. Bell. 
It was likewise error of the trial court to hoi d that 
Bell "is· not estopped from asserting and ·claiming that 
the said note sued on is a valid and existing obligation 
and that the same was not compromised and settled by 
the scaledown agreement, on or about August13, 1934, 
and that the same was not included in said .scaledown 
agreement signed by Alfred J. Bell in consideration of 
making said loan to defendant and was not compromised 
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for the sum of $150.00 or otherwise." Such finding is 
likewise contrary to the undisputed evidence, the scale-
down agreement. 
3. The Court "likeUJise errred in its Fifnding No. 5, 
findmg that a"i the time of the execution of the said note, 
defendamt was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of 
$1250.00, etc. This was error because: 
(a) It was wholly outside and a departure from 
any ·claim or issue rai"Sed by the pleading1s. Such an idea 
first occured to plaintiff's counsel at the close of the trial. 
We were taken by complete surprise when counsel sug-
gested that to his witness. In the City Court, counsel 
conceded that the $400.00 s·caledown should be credited 
on he promi~ssory note. At the ·conclusion of the trial in 
the District Court, counsel suggested this new idea to Mr. 
Bell, who agreed that was probably correct. The, trial 
court adopted that as correct, without any pleading, or 
any issued formed thereon. 
(b) There was no evidence to support such a find-
ing. 'The plaintiff produced no valid testimony to that 
effect. In examining plaintiff's witnes1s, Alfred J. Bell, 
plaintiff's counsel, by leading questions, asked the wit-
ness if the indebtedness. was not $1250.00 at the time of 
the scaledown agreement? and if it was not a fact that 
the s.caledown of $400.00 left a balance of $850.00, for 
which the note was given? Alfred J. Bell, the witness 
all!Swered, that he thought that was it, or words to that 
J 
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sufficient to support a judgment, particularly one depart-
ing from the pleadings, and contrary to the documentary 
evidence, as has been heretofore pointed out. 
4. The Corurt erred in its Finding No. 9, that s;aid 
note UJaSJ not maJ.de and detivered through inadverrtance 
and mistake, etc. (Error No. 11). 
We have already pointed out that the evidence (paid 
checks) conclusively shows (considering the admission in 
the escrow agreement of $200.00 paid, and the assign-
ment to the Utah Mortgage Loan Corporation to cover 
. 
$2500.00 out of the escrow), that no more than $400.00 
could possible have been due Alfred J. Bell, August 1934, 
even assuming that the balance of the escrow agreement, if 
any were due, was assigned hack to Bell of which re-
spondent produced no evidence. That being true, and 
Alfred J. Bell having also signed a scale down agreement 
in July or August, 1934, stating that the existing indebt-
edness was $400.00 and agreeing to take $150.00 as settle-
ment thereof,-why isn't that quite conclusive proof that 
appellant signed that $850.00 note through inadvertance 
and mistake? If A can prove, and B al~so admits, in a 
written statement, that A didn't owe B over $400.00, but 
nevertheless signs a promissory note to B for $850.00,-
the .court should not hesitate to find that A signed such 
note through inadvertance and mistake as he alleges and 
claims he did at the trial. 
In addition to that, we invite the court's attention 
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14. 
to the testimony of Alfred J. Bell (A b. 25). Few wi~ 
nes1ses have ever taken the witness· stand who were so 
indefinite hazy and uncertain in their testimony, or in 
what they were saying. Appellants memory was also very 
poor. It is .not difficult to see how these two men could 
make mi,stake by inadvertance. It is easy to see how they 
could and did make mistakes in their financial dealings. 
Alfred J. Bell assigns his interest in the escrow agree-
ment over to the Utah Mortgage Loan Corporation, which 
he has apparently entirely forgotten. He likewise forgot 
to have it assigned back to him after Jones has paid the 
$2500.00 mortgage indebtedness thereon, nevertheless, he 
goes right on and assumes that the equity (if any exists) 
belongs to him. The Utah Mortgage Loan Corporation 
turned the assigned contract, attached to the assignment 
(both documents admitted in evidence, Ex 6)., over to 
Parley P. Jones. Bell hasn't a thing to show that Jones 
is indebted to him for one dollar. But nevertheless, Jones 
apparently si~ns a note for $850.00 to Alfred J. Bell. 
About the same time or a couple of week·s later, Bell signs 
a scaledown agreement, stating that the existing indebt-
edness from Jones to him is $400.00 and he agrees to 
accept $150.00, a:s settlement thereof, which amount is 
paid to 'him by the Federal Lank Bank in persuance to 
said scaledown agreement. ,He did not .surrender the note 
as he should have done when he received the $150.00. 
Later on he starts to collect on the note. Jones figures he 
is bound in as much as he failed to have the note delivered 
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up, and starts to make payment thereon. The money thus 
paid should be returned as prayed for in the counter claim. 
5. The Court erred in its Firnding No. 7, and in its 
Conclusion of Law No. 3, that Alfred J. BeU did' not rep-
resent in his scaledaum agreement, that the existing obli-
gation at that time was $400.00, and in ho~dirng that the 
note sru.ed on was not compromised and settled by the 
scaled'own agreem.ent (Errors 10, 12). 
In discussing this important legal question, the effect 
of a scaledown agreement, we must assume that appel-
lant was indebted to Alfred J. Bell in excess of the 
amount of $400.00, which appellant does not admit. Ap-
pellant illJSists that respondent had the burden of proof, 
and failed to prove such fact. We have pointed out that 
from the evidence adduced, Jones could not, in July, 1934, 
have owed Bell in excess of $400.00. 
The trial ·court found that at the time of _ the scale-
down agreement, August, 1934, appellant was indebted 
in the sum of $1250.00 to Alfred J. Bell. We have point-
ed out that there is no evidence to support or justify such 
finding, nor is there any pleading alleging or claiming 
such fact. If this court should decide that appellant wa8 
not indebted to Alfred J. Bell in excess of $400.00, at the 
time of the scaledown agreement, August, 1934, then it 
would necessarily follow that the note for $850.00 was 
not only without consideration, but had been made 
through inadvertance and mistake. 
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If this court shall conclude from the evidence that 
appellant was indebted to Alfred J. Bell $850.00 (the 
amount of the note), or $1250.00 (as the trial court 
found), at the time when the scale down agreement was 
signed, then the question arises: What was the legal ef-
fect, in either case, of signing the scaledown agreement? 
If the indebtedness was more than $400.00 at the 
time when the 'Scaledown agreement was signed, then we 
submit that Alfred J. Bell is not only estopped, from later ,;~ 
asserting or ·claiming that it was any larger or different 
amount, but the said scaledown agreement compromised 
and settled the indebtedness, whatever its amount. 
It is submitted that the purpose and intent of the 
Federal Farm Loan Act was to help the land owner, the 
farmer, who was in financial distress, to assi,st him in get-
ting on a better financial basis, and to assist such bor-
rower to procure an accord and satisfaction and a s.cale-
down among his ·creditors. 
It is appellant's contention that the note sued on was 
settled by an accord and sati·sfaction. The Federal Land 
Bank would not make its loan unless the creditors with 
liens on the borrowers land definitely agreed to ac.cept 
the amount of ·cash which was available as satisfactiont 
of their claims. Many ·creditors are willing to accept a 
reduction in order to secure cash. Such reductions are 
p_assed on to the borrower. If a secret side agreement is 
permitted, by which the debtor 'agrees to pay his credit-
or the amount, or a portion of it, which the creditor has 
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agreed, by his ·scaledo:wn agreement, to scale off, in con-
sideration of getting .cash, then it is obvious that the 
main party benefitted is not the borrower, but his 
creditor. 
In the case McAllister vs. Drapeau, 92 Pac. 2nd, 915, 
the California Supreme Court, discussing an H. 0. L. C. 
case .said: 
'_'***Obviously, before these facts could be as-
certained, a full disclosure of the amount and the 
term·a of the proposed second lien would have to be 
made to the H. 0. L. C. The securing of a second 
lien by the creditor without such disclosure is 
clearly violation of the letter and spirit of the stat-
ute and regulations. This is demonstrated not only 
by the terms of the statute and the regulations, 
but also by the language of the agreement above 
quoted that all creditors were required to sign 
wherein the creditor represented and agreed that 
he was accepting the bonds 'in full settlement of 
the claim of the undersigned'.'· 
"The obtaining of secret second liens by the 
creditor violates the basic public policy expressed 
in the act. The act was intended solely for the 
benefit of home owners who were in financial diffi-
culties-no one else was eligible for its benefits. 
Any benefit to creditor1s was merely incidental. But 
if a creditor ·could lawfully exact a secret second 
lien from his debtor, in many cases this would con-
fer the benefits of the act on the creditor rather 
than on the debtor.***" 
"***Our examination of the authorities has fail-
ed to dis·close a single case upholding the validity 
of such secret second mortgage.***" 
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"Several of.the courts to which the problem here 
involved ha:s been presented, in addition to hold-
ing the secret second mortgage illegal, have held 
that in signing the 'Mortgagee's Consent to Take 
Bonds'., above quoted, the creditor agreed to accept 
such bonds 'in full settlement' of his claim, and 
that such agreement ~onstitutes an accord and sat-
i'Sfaction, a relea;se or a novation. Cook vs. Donner, 
supra; Chaves County Building & Loan Ass'n vs. 
Hodgfls, supra. The holding of the"Se courts is 
sound. The agreement signed by the creditor was 
to accept the bonds "in full settlement of the claim ~· 
of the undersigned***." 
In the case International Harvester Co. vs. Young, 
285 N. W. 12, 288 Mich. 463, the court held that any agree-
ment made by the borrower (in case at bar, appellants 
note for $850.00) in the face of a 'Scaledown agreement, is 
void as contrary to publi'c policy. In that case,_ the court 
said: 
"The defendants claim that the note and mort-
gage were :not executed until sometime in Febru-
ary, 1935. The ·court believes they were mistaken 
in this, but at any rate it does not appear to be im-
portanet whether the note an·d ·mortgage were exe-
cuted before colllSumma tion of the loan or after-
words, the important point being that the bill of 
sale was executed before the consummation, to 
take effect at the consummation, and all of the 
parties agree that this bill of sale was executed on 
or about September 10, 1934, and during the neg-
otiations for the loan. It wa'S thi~s instrument that 
enabled the plaintiff to secure from the defendants 
the chattel ·mortgage and note recured thereby.'' 
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" 'The Federal Land Bank and Federal Farm 
Mortgage Corporation are instrumentalities of the 
United States.' 
Smith vs. Kansas City T. & T. Co., 255 U. S. 180; 
Federal Land Bank vs. Gaines, 290 U. S. 247. 
The purpose of making this particular loan was 
not only to save the borrower's real estate from 
foreclosure of ex1"sting mortgages but to settl'e all 
other outstanding indebtedness, whether ~secured 
or not. If the amount that could be loaned, based 
on an appraisal of the property, was insufficient 
to meet all of the outstanding obligations, then the 
creditors were compelled, as a condition to the loan 
being made, to scale down their indebtedness to a 
point where the amount that could be loaned was 
sufficient to cover all debts." 
"The purposes of the legislation permitting the 
loaning of money to farmer for rehabilitation pur-
poses are similar to the purposes of the Home Own-
ers' Loan Act, but more comprehensive since it 
applies to all of the d.ebts of the borrowe·r and not 
to mortgages on the homestead alone. 
In both of the cases cited the court holds that 
the additional evidence, of debt, cannot be enforc-
ed because against public policy. The additional 
security or evidence of debt were there taken sec-
retly as in the present case, is void. In the latter 
case the court says: 
'The test is not what the plaintiff did in with-
holding action on the note for a proper period, but 
rather what the plaintiff and others could do if 
such a practice were to receive judicial approval. 
In principle, if this action is permissible under the 
statutei then the authorized holder of a second 
mortgage could secretly take back a note payable 
the :next day and immediately enforce this obliga-
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tion to the utter destruction of the purpose of the 
statute. A survey of the transa:ction as a whole 
leads to the conclusion that to give validity to the 
note sued upon would be to sanction a violation of 
the spirit of the statute and contravene public 
policy.' 
Additional security to that agreed to be accepted 
under the Home Owners' Loan Act was also held 
to be unenforceable in 
Stager vs. Junker, et al, (N.J.) 188 Atl. 440, and 
Chaves Co. Bldg. & D & L Ass'n vs. Hodges (N. 
Mex.) 59 Pa·c. 671. 
In the latter case the decision tuf!ns upon the 
question of aecord and oatisfaction, with reference 
also to the question of public policy. 
In F,ederal Land Bank of Columbia, et al. vs. 
Blackshear Bank et al. (Ga.) 186 S. E., 724, the 
court says: 
'The creditor who made this agreement as a part 
of the ·condition upon which the lender proposed to 
make the loan could not afterwards enforce a 
mortgage which he had taken on other property of 
the debtor pending the negotiations for the loan 
and in contemplation thereof, but without the 
knowledge of the lender, covering the difference 
between the full amou:nt of his claim against the 
debtor and the reduced amount which he agreed 
to accept in full settlement thereof, where the en-
forcement of such mortgage might in any way im-
peril the security taken by the lender under the 
conditions above .stated, or hinder the debtor in the 
fulfillment of his obligation to the lender. What is 
said above applies also to the prosecution to judg-
ment of a small note for $173 which one of the 
creditors had taken under the same circumstances· 
' 
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because, if the holder of this note be permitted to 
reduce it to judgment, he would, by reason of that 
judgment, be in a position to make such assertion 
of it as "\vould interfere with the scheme that was 
entered into, whereby the debtor was released 
from a part of his debts to the original creditor so 
as to obtain the loan referred to above'." 
''***It is sufficient if the plaintiff has by accept-
ing the bill of sale from the borrower and the mort-
gage and notes from the defendants interfered 
with the scheme whereby the borrower was sup-
posed to be released from his debts to his various 
creditors and the one debt to the land bank under 
more favorable conditions substituted therefor. 
The securing of the bill of sale from Earl R. 
Young- in addition to the amount agreed to be ac-
eepted in full settlement, was in violation of the 
spirit and purpose of the Federal Land Bank Act, 
and the instrument was void as contrary to public 
policy." 
"The counsel for plaintiff argues that the land 
bank was only acting as the agent for Earl R. 
Young in the disbursement of the proceeds of the 
loan, but the making of the loan depended upon all 
of the debts of the borrower being paid, and the 
circumstances made the Federal Land Bank a third 
party to such an extent as to make the advance-
ment by it to the plaintiff a payment by a third 
party constituting an accord and 'Satisfaction al-
thougp in a Ie,ss amount than the amount of the 
debt. This is indicated in the J ~ssewich First 
Citizens Bank & Trust Co. and Chaves C. ,Bldg. & 
D & I..J cases hereinbefore ·cited, as applied to the 
·Home Owners' Loan Corporation. If it applies to 
the Home Owners' Loan Corporation it should 
apply to the Federal Land Bank inaJSmuch as re-
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habilitation purposes of the Home Loan Act only 
applies to homesteads, while the Federal Land 
Bank Act applies to all of the property and debts 
of the borrower." 
A 'Second mortgage taken without knowledge of 
Home Owners' Loan Corporation, in violation of 
statute and regulations thereunder, as security for 
part payment of judgment released by refunding, 
was void and unenforceable as against public pol-
icy. Home Owners' Loan Act 1933, art. 4 (k), 12 
U. S. C. A. art. 1463 (k) .-Markowitz vs. Berg, 4 
a. 2nd 410, 125 N. J. Eq. 56. 
Matters to be considered in determining validity 
of mortgagors' agreement to remain bound on bal-
ance of original indebtedness after refinancing of 
obligation through Home Owners' Loan Corporaa-
tion are the absence of collusion or concealment of 
the obligation from the authorized officials of the 
corporation and their consent to the mortgagors' 
continued obligation for the bala:nce. 12 U. S. C. 
U. art. 1461 et seq.-Keystone Bank of Spangler, 
Pa. v~s. Pooth, 6 A. 2nd 417. 
Where, while negotiations for a Home Owners' 
Loan Corporation loan are pending; the existing 
mortgagee secretly obtains from the owner a new 
mortgage in an amount greater than permitted for 
a junior lien by the corporation's rule, and there-
after advises the corporation that it will accept 
the proceeds of the new mortgage and a junior 
lien in the permitted amount, but nevertheless, its 
original mortgage having been satiiSfied and the 
Home Owners' Loan Corr>oration mortgage record-
ed, proceeds to record the secretly obtained mort-
gage, its action is illegal and the mortgage void.-
Masci vs. Moose Building & Loan Ass'n, 33 D. & C. 
458. 
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Where vendors pursuant to refinancing plan as-
signed vendor's lien notes to Federal Land Bank 
under assignment reciting that all notes not includ-
ed therein were paid and lien securing payment 
thereof released, second lien notes executed by 
purchasers to vendors for amount advanced by 
vendors to saisfy judgment against purchasers 
plus difference between bal~nce owing on vendor's 
lien notes and bonds received in exchange therefor 
were void together with liens securing them so far 
as they brought forward any part of vendor's lien 
notes because thwarting purpose, spirit and policy 
of Farm Mortgage Act under which debt was re-
financed. Emergency Farm Act of 1933 article 
32-35, 12 U. S. C. A. article 1016-1019; Federal 
Farm Mortgage Corporation Act, 12 U. S. C. A. 
art. 1020 et seq.-Mc Crary vs. Smeltzer, 124 S. 
W. 2d 336, reversing Smeltzer vs. McCrory, 101 A. 
w. 2d 850. 
Where vendor and vendee agreed that vendor 
would represent to Federal Land Bank that ven-
dee's indebtedness to vendor for realty had been 
reduced to amount of loan by land bank which was 
in amount of three-fourths of appraised value of 
land, and vendee agreed to execute notes to vendor 
in excess of amount of loan, notes given by vendeed 
in excess of amount of loan by Federal Land Bank 
would be void as violative of Emergency Farm 
Mortgage Act. Emergency Farm Mortgage Act" 
1933, Art. 32-35, 12 U. S. C. A. art. 1016-1019.-
Briley v~s. Oldham, 124 S. W. 2d 854, reversing Old-
ham vs. :Briley, 118 S. W. 2d 797. 
Notes obtained by a ·creditor in violation of a 
scale-down agreement entered into between the 
creditor and a farm debtor at the behest of the 
Federal Land Bank as a part of a refinancing plan 
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are void, irrespective of fact that the Federal Land 
Bank acquires a first mortgage or a first deed of 
trust under the plan..-O'Neil vs. Johnson, 29 F. 
Supp. 307. 
Notes obtained by creditor in violation of a 
scale-down agreement entered into between the 
creditor and farm debtors at behest of Federal 
Land Bank as part of refinancing plans were void 
as against the Federal Land Bank as well as 
against debtors, notwithstanding that a receive·r 
acted for the ·creditor and obtained a court order 
approving the settlement of the .claims against 
debtors, where court was not informed as to the 
circumstances under which notes were exacted 
and Land Bank made the loan without knowledge 
of the exaction of the notes by the receiver. 12 U. 
S. C. A. art. 192.-0'Neil vs. Johnson, 29 F. Supp. 
307. 
Building and loan association's action, after ac-
cepting bonds in less amount than mortgage debt 
from Home Owners' Loan Corporation in full set-
tlement of a:s·sociation's claim against mortgaged 
property in taking a second trust deed, stock cer-
tificates, and grant deed as security from mort-
gagor for balance of indebtedness, was illegal and 
void. Home Owners' Loan A·ct 1933, 48 Stat. 128, 
12 U. S. C. A. eart 1461 et seq.-Woods vs. Kern 
Mut. Building & Loan Ass'n 93 P. 2d 837. 
Where savings and loan company agreed to ac-
cept :Home Owners' Loan Corporation bonds in 
less amount than mortgage debt in settlement of 
company'·s claim against mortgaged property, but 
also required mortgagor to pay $500 in cash and 
give a note for $500, the transaction was void as 
violative of the basic public policy expressed in 
the Home Owners' Loan Act. Home Owners' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25 
Loan Act 1933, as amended, 12 U. S. C. A. Art. 
1463 et seq.-Richard R. Adams Co. vs. Pacific 
States Savings & Loan Co., 94 P. 2d 370. 
The Home Owners' Loan Corporation is a public 
agency, and a note taken in contravention of 
creditor's agreement with corporation, whereby 
creditor agreed to accept a lesser sum in full of 
her ·claim against debtor, is. void as against public 
policy. 12 U. S. C. A. Art. 1467; U. S. C. A. Const. 
art, 1 art 10; Amend. 5.-Johnson vs. Matthews, 
22 N. E. 2d 772, 301 Ill. App. 295. 
Where mortgagee acquiring title by foreclosure 
executed agreement consenting to accept bonds 
of Home Owners' Loan Corporation and small 
amount of cash and to release all claims against 
property, second mortgage subsequently taken by 
mortgagee without sanction of ·corporation was 
void as against "public policy". Home Owners' 
Loan Act 1933, as amended, 12 U. S. C. A. art 
1461 et seg.-Council vs. Cohen, 21 N. E. 2d 967. 
Agreement made by mortgagee, who executed 
to Home Owners' Loan Corporation release of all 
his claims against mortgagor and received less 
amount in bonds from Corporation, whereby mort-
gagor gave mortgagee .note and second mortgage 
on the property to cover loss mortgagee had sus-
tained in making release held against public pol-
icy, and to invalidate note and second mortgage 
notwithstanding agreement was not secret and 
"Principal Attorney" of Home Owners' Loan Cor-
poration allegedly ratified agreement by recog.niz-
ing validity of note and second mortgage. Home 
Owners' Loan Act of 1933, as amended, 12 U. S. 
C. A. art 1461 et seq., art 1463 (k) .-Cook v~s. Don-
ner, 66 P. (2d) 587, 145 Kan. 67 4. 
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Where mortgagee, i·n connection with procure-
ment of loan from Home Owners' Loan Corpora-
tion, discharged mortgages as paid, and delivered 
note secured by ·such mortgages to corporation, 
secret renewal note exe-cuted by mortgagors to 
mortgagee for balance of indebtedness held void 
as against public policy.-First Citizens Bank & 
Trust Co. of Utica vs. Speaker, 294, N. Y. S. 737, 
modifying (Sup.) 287 N. Y. S. 831, 159 Misc. 427. 
Where holders of vendor's lien notes received 
from federal land bank portion of loan to purch-
a·sers in exchange for assignment of all .notes not 
fully paid, notes thereafter executed by purchas-
ers to include balance on original vendor's lien 
notes which remained unpaid held void (12 U. S. 
C. A. art 1019; Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. art. 1536). 
-Smeltzer vs. McCrory, 101 S. W. (2d) 850, error 
granted. 
Where bank holding mortgage agreed to take, 
in full satisfaction of mortgage, bonds of Home 
Owners' Loan Corporation within ninety days, 
and where affidavit of bank president made at 
date of closing of Joan after expiration of ninety 
days stated that no agreement had been made 
with home owner to pay discount on bonds, the 
termination of the ninety-day provision was waiv-
ed, as regards validity of contract of home owner 
to pay difference between par value and market 
value of bonds (Home Owner,g' Loan Act, 12 U. S. 
C. A. art 1467 (e).-Pye vs. Grunert, 275 N. W. 
615, rehearing denied 276 N. W. 221. 
An agreement exacted by a lien holder which 
tends to counteract the relief of the home owner 
sought by the Home Owners' Loan Act in invalid 
as contrary to the purpose of the act and regula-
tions adopted thereunder. Home Owners' Loan 
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Act of 1933, Art 4, as amended, 12 U. S. C. A. art 
1463.-Meek vs. Wilson, 278 N. W. 731, 283 Mich. 
679. 
A second mortgage exacted by mortgagee in ad-
dition to payment in bonds and cash by Home 
Owners' Loan Corporation in refinancing trans-
action was unenforeable as contrary to public pol-
icy where total amount of first mortgage and sec-
ond mortgage was in exces'S of amount of ap-
praised value of property, in violation of regula-
tion of Home Owners' Loan Corporation. Home 
Owners' Loan Act of 1933, art 1 et seq., as amend-
ed 12 U. S. C. A. art 1461 et seq.-Meek vs. Wil-
son, 278 N. W. 731, 283 Mich. 679. 
Where holder of note accepted less than face 
amount thereof in full settlement and transferred 
note to Federal Land Bank under agreement with 
maker and Federal Land Bank, note which was 
subsequently executed by the same maker to 
cover difference between fact amount of original 
note and amount accepted in settlement wa'S not 
supported by consideration.-Kinard vs. Bank of 
Leno, 196 S. E. 920, 57 Ga. App. 819. 
An agree~ent between mortgagee and home 
owner made without approval of Home Owners' 
Loan Corporation by which owner assumes or 
agrees to pay all or any part of mortgage debt 
which has been settled and releaJsed by the re-
funding effected by the ·corporation is void as 
against public policy and cannot be enforced by 
the mortgagee. Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, 
art 4 (k), 12 U. S. C. A. art 1463 (k) .-Anderson 
vs. Horst, 200 A. 721. 
Mortgagors' unlawful agreement to pay mort-
gagee a part of mortgage debt which has been 
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settled and released by the .refunding effected by 
Home Owners' Loan Horporation could not be en-
forced by Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, 12 U. 
S. C. A. art 1461 et •seq.-Anderson vs. Horst, 200 
A. 721. 
Where vendor of realty and vendee agreed that 
vendor would represent to the Federal Land Bank 
that vendee's indebtedness to bank for realty had 
been reduced to amount of loan by land bank 
which was in amount of three-fourths of apprais-
ed value of land, or that vendor had canceled 
vendee's debt in excess of loan, a:nd vendee agreed 
to execute notes to vendor in excess of amount of 
loan, and third person was substituted as purch-
aser for vendee, notes given by vendee or third 
person in excess of amount of loan by Federal 
Land Bank would be void as violative of statutes 
and contrary to public policy. 12 U. S. L. A. art 
771, subds. 4, (d), 5; are 781, sub d. 2; arts. 981, 
987, 1016 (b), 1019.-0ldham vs. Briley, 118 S. 
w. 2d 797. 
In the ·court below, counsel for respondent stated 
that in some of the H. 0. L. C. cases, the courts have held 
that a side agreement between the borrower and ·creditor, 
whereby the borrower give'S his note for the difference (or 
a portion thereof), between the full amount of the debt, 
and the amount the creditor actually receives in bonds 
or otherwise from the H. 0. L. C. loan, have been held to 
be valid and enforceable. 
In all such cases, however, there was no scaledown 
agreement or other representation by the creditor that 
he would a·ccept a stated les,ser amount as settlement in 
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full of the existing obligation. The courts are also care-
ful, in those cases, where the side agreement is upheld, in 
pointing out that the creditor must not have been guilty 
of misrepresentation, fraud or deception in any manner 
or respect, but must have acted openly and in g_ood faith. 
In every case, so far as we have been able to check, where 
the creditor has signed a S"caledown agreement, definitely 
agreeing to accpet a lesser amount in satisfaction of his 
existing oblig-ation against the debtor, the courts have 
held not valid and unenforceable, as against public policy, 
any side or secret agreement by which the creditor had 
the debtor sig.n a Qote or other agreement to pay part or 
all of the portion of the debt which was supposed to be 
scaled down. 
Counsel for respondent seeks to .excuse the act and ·con-
duct of Alfred J. Bell, by saying that he only agreed to 
scale off $400.00 of the exi·sting obligation of $1250.00, 
and then, took from the debtor the $850.00 note sued on, 
for the balance. But Bell represented i:n his scaledown 
agreement that the existing obligation was $400.00; and 
he agreed to take $150.00 as settlement thereof. Hence, 
by representing that the existing obligation was only 
$400.00, and by taking a secret side agreement .note for 
$850.00, he deceived and misled the Federal Land Bank 
to exactly the ~same manner and extent as though he had 
done it in the usual way,-stated, in hi~s scaledown agree-
ment that the existing obligation was $1250.00 and had 
agreed to take $150.00 as settlement thereof; and had 
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then taken appellant's side note for $850.00, represent-
i,ng. a portion of the indebtedness which he had been 
scaled off. In either case, the effect and result is exact-
ly the same. The Federal Land Bank was misled, but in-
duced to make the loan to the borrower, and pay over 
certain money to the creditor's, which the Federal La:nd 
Bank did upon the understanding that those creditors 
were paid and .settled in full. Alfred J. Bell, by this cun-
ning method, interfered with the scheme whereby the 
borrower was supposed to be released from his debts to 
Bell, which the court said in the Young case, supra, is 
sufficient to make the side agreement (note) void, as 
against public policy. 
Counsel also argued In the court below, that from 
the closing statement (defendant's Ex. 11, A b. 13) it is 
stated in paragraph 5, "This loan is approved on condi-
tion that all debts both secured and unsecured are scaled 
dowrn to an amount not to exceed $4700.00." But we sub-
mit that Alfred J. Bell is :not in any position to take ad-
vantage of ·such statement. Such statement did not apply 
to him. That debt limit, _$4 700.00, apparently W3Js the 
total of all debts, ·secured and unsecured. The three 
creditors who claimed liens on the premises, were requir-
ed to sign scaledown agreements. Hence, said paragraph 
5 continues: "We are in receipt of an Agreement from 
each of the following, by the terms of which he agrees to 
accept the following sum in full satisfaction of his claim: 
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Louis F. Bodrero ---------------------------- $1850.00 
Utah Mortgage Loan Corporation $1100.00 
Alfred J. Bell ---------------------------------- $ 150.00'' 
That the bank was thus definitely led to believe that 
the three creditors named were accepting the respective 
amounts set opposite their names as full satisfaction of 
their respective claims, is further borne out by the sec-
ond paragraph i:n paragraph No. 7 of said closing state-
ment (Ab. 13-14): 
"We have been informed by the applicant that the 
following creditors are to receive approximately the fol-
lowing amounts from loan proceeds: 
Name of Creditor Approximate Claim 
Louis F. Bodrero ------------------------------ $1850.00 
Utah Mortgage Loan Corporation $1100.00 
Alfred J. Bell ------------------------------------$ 150.00" 
We further submit, the debt from Jones to Bell was 
discharged by an accord and satisfa:ction, when the scale-
down agreement was signed, by which agre.ement Alfred 
J. Bell agreed to accel!t and was paid $150.00 as full 
satisfaction of the existing obligation between them. 
What the total amount of that obligation was, is relative-
ly unimportant. The important thing is that Bell agreed 
to accept $150.00 from the Federal Land Bank 
as full satisfaction of the existing obligation. 
That the F,ederal Land Bank undeiiStood by the 
sig.ned scaledown agreement, in this ·case, that each of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
82 
·the three creditors had agreed to accept the amount stat-
ed irn the respective scaledown agrreements, is evident, 
and is conclusively ·shown from the statement hereabove 
quoted, which we take the liberty to repeat: "We are in 
receipt of an agreement from each of the following, by 
the terms of which he agrees to accept the following sum 
in full satisfaction of his claim: Alfred J. Bell, $150.00." 
The mere fact that Alfred J. Bell wrote in "$400.00", 
as the existing obligation, should not put him in any fav-
ored position. That was a misrepresentation, (if the ex-
isting obligation was larger than $400.00) and was ap-
parently part of Bell's scheme to obtain a secret side 
agreement (the promissory note for $850.00) in violation 
of his scaledown agreement, which the courts have uni-
formly held is against public policy and against the rules 
and regulations of the Farm Loan Act, and therefore 
void and unenforceable. 
The following cases are in point, to the effect that a 
debt is discharged by way of accord and satisfaction 
through payment, by or through a third party., of less 
than the amount of the debt, which payment is accepted 
by the creditor as settlement in full of the debt: 
Cunni,ngham vs. Irwin, 182 Mich. 629, 148 N. W. 786; 
People vs. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 195 Mich. 738, 162 
N. W. 338; 
Birenberg vs. Haxgmas, 273 Mich. 1932, 262 N. W. 
914; 
Jessewish vs. Abbne, 154 Misc. 768, 277 N. Y. Supp. 
599; 
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Partride vs. 'Monynihan, 59 Misc. 234, 110 N. Y. Sup. 
539; 
Seaver vs. Ransom, 224, N. Y. 233. 
1 Am. J ur. 24 7, Sigler vs. Sigler, 98 Kan. 324, 158 P. 
864, L. R. A. 1917A, 725. 
Lastly, the court erred in dismissing the defendant's 
·counterclaim for $277.70 (Assignment of Error No. 3) 
paid by appellant on the said note, which in fact was un-
justly and illegally taken and was also given through mis-
take and inadvertance, as we have heretofore shown. 
Under such circumstances we respectfully submit that 
the payments totaling $277.70, which are undisputed, 
which Bell collected from Jones, ,should be returned and 
Jones should have been granted judgment for said amount 
as prayed for in his counter claim. 
For each and all of the foregoing reasons we respect-
ively submit that the trial court erred in entering judg-
ment against appellant on the note sued on, and further 
erred in holding that the amount of the judgment as 
rendered represents tre balance due on the purchase 
price on the premises described in the said judgment. 
We submit the court also erred in ruling to enter judg-
ment on his counter claim for the money which had been 
wrongfully collected against him on said note. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LEON FONNESBECK, 
Attorney for Defendant wnd Appellant. 
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